Cosa Nostra Editions
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Sunday, June 28, 2009
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Monday, June 22, 2009
Thursday, May 14, 2009
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Like Poe's orangutan, Zarathustra's animals do not belong at home, in homes--they are unheimlich. The "speech" of animals is uncanny because, even if it is only "jabbering," it manages to produce in Zarathustra the semblance of a world, of a full exteriority within which language circulates. Heidegger explains that "after such solitude the world is like a garden, even when it is invoked by mere empty talk, in the sheer play of words and phrases." The discourse of animals thus provokes a deep sense of solitude, an abundance of emptiness. It is in this sense that those animals are uncanny: Zarathustra feels alone in their company. For Heidegger, Zarathustra's exchange with the animals portrays the "loneliest loneliness," an experience of solitude that reveals, for an instant (the shadowless moment of a suspended midday), the animal world....
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche writes: "Indeed perhaps there was nothing more fearful and uncanny in the whole prehistory of man than his mnemotechnics." The fear and pain that accompany Zarathustra's entry into the abyss of an animal world arise from the depths of memory, or as Nietzsche phrases it, from the prehistory of man." By engaging the animals, Zarathustra--and by inference, humanity--plummets from the edifice of world (language and memory) into the immemorial open of a time before world. And this time before world, this prehistory of man, returns to humanity as the figure of the animal. Animal being forces humanity to acknowledge the finitude of world: that is, animals tear humanity away from the imagined totality of world. In this way, the Nietzschean and Heideggerian animal meet at a point beyond language, world, and memory--at a point beyond mortality. The point beyond world is marked for Nietzsche by forgetting, for Heidegger by erasure; and for both Nietzsche and Heidegger, the beyond is recalled by the figure of the animal. For Nietzsche, however, the world beyond represents a "robust health," and the possibility of a new beginning, a "new promise," whereas for Heidegger it is a saddened and darkened affair.
Akira Lippit, from Electric Animal
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche writes: "Indeed perhaps there was nothing more fearful and uncanny in the whole prehistory of man than his mnemotechnics." The fear and pain that accompany Zarathustra's entry into the abyss of an animal world arise from the depths of memory, or as Nietzsche phrases it, from the prehistory of man." By engaging the animals, Zarathustra--and by inference, humanity--plummets from the edifice of world (language and memory) into the immemorial open of a time before world. And this time before world, this prehistory of man, returns to humanity as the figure of the animal. Animal being forces humanity to acknowledge the finitude of world: that is, animals tear humanity away from the imagined totality of world. In this way, the Nietzschean and Heideggerian animal meet at a point beyond language, world, and memory--at a point beyond mortality. The point beyond world is marked for Nietzsche by forgetting, for Heidegger by erasure; and for both Nietzsche and Heidegger, the beyond is recalled by the figure of the animal. For Nietzsche, however, the world beyond represents a "robust health," and the possibility of a new beginning, a "new promise," whereas for Heidegger it is a saddened and darkened affair.
Akira Lippit, from Electric Animal
Wednesday, March 4, 2009
Saturday, February 14, 2009
Sunday, February 8, 2009
It's not that, in the Marxist sense, things really are social relations which have become opaque; they both are and affect social relations, they are a partner in them, and all 'social' relations mix together chains of humans and nonhumans. Latour's exemplary objects--a speed bump, a hotel key with a weight attached to it, a door closer, a camera--are inscribed and programmed by human will and in turn, as nonhuman delegates, require humans to behave in certain ways. The speed bump 'is not made of matter, ultimately; it is full of engineers and chancellors and lawmakers, commingling their wills and their story lines with those of gravel, concrete, paint, and standard calculation.' Matter and persons connect and intermingle in a zone 'where some, though not all, of the characteristics of concrete become policemen, and some, though not all, of the characteristics of policemen become speed bumps.'
John Frow, from "A Pebble, a Camera, a Man Who Turns into a Telegraph Pole"
John Frow, from "A Pebble, a Camera, a Man Who Turns into a Telegraph Pole"
Friday, January 23, 2009
Thursday, January 22, 2009
Saturday, January 3, 2009
Saturday, November 29, 2008
Thursday, October 23, 2008
Friday, October 17, 2008
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
He reminded them that in the time of the Great Inflation (1922) the process of dissolution became so rapid the workers had to be paid twice a day to survive. At this point an ingenious government minister invented the "agricultural mark"; Germany was saved and the Nazis began to prepare for their take over. "Agricultural mark" meant that you anchored the value of paper money to products of the earth (crops). Suddenly the farmers were rich. Germany was powerful again and was driven to a thirst for even more by this superior new philosophy, which had been quickly obtained by making a few small manipulations of "ordinary" philosophy. But people didn't make these connections then. An indelible photo has remained printed on my mind: the image of wheelbarrows full of paper money needed to buy a kilogram of bread. Again and again, every time I tallied up my daily expenses, the image of the wheelbarrows leaped forward in my mind. You can get along without a car, and I got along without one, but bread at ten thousand lira had to have been the beginning of the last phase of the catastrophe.
Antonio Porta, from The King of the Storeroom, 1978 (trans. Lawrence R. Smith)
Antonio Porta, from The King of the Storeroom, 1978 (trans. Lawrence R. Smith)
Saturday, August 23, 2008
Ange Mlinko on Simone dos Anjos's Comedies at the Poetry Foundation blog
Friday, July 4, 2008
Saturday, June 21, 2008
Tuesday, June 10, 2008
Monday, June 2, 2008
Friday, May 9, 2008
Being is blinding and anywhere is blinder. I try to keep going, to stay nowhere, to see. Movement is blind. Soaring is illumination which blinds. Where there's no logic left, there's life, logic's opposite. Inanimate is not the opposite of logic. The song's tune was logic or mourning; a tune whose even flying is a burial: one of life's practice-deaths. Any cleaning or cleaving is also practice-death. Everything shows that. What you can't see in the sky is the sky. Seeing is everywhere b's enemy.
I am reading (in Pussy): "As if to find out was simply to see...To see equaled to accept, because the object of my sight was exactly what I was now forced to accept." And on the same page I'm reading: "I couldn't tell which one I was. I kept looking and looking, but I could no longer find myself. I realized that I'd escaped my death because I no longer knew who I was."
Stacy Doris, from Conference
I am reading (in Pussy): "As if to find out was simply to see...To see equaled to accept, because the object of my sight was exactly what I was now forced to accept." And on the same page I'm reading: "I couldn't tell which one I was. I kept looking and looking, but I could no longer find myself. I realized that I'd escaped my death because I no longer knew who I was."
Stacy Doris, from Conference
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
Saturday, April 19, 2008
Friday, April 18, 2008
I could say as much for what we call the "work of art." How do we recognize such a work? Only by the following: That faced with it, we do not stay faced, but we meet, we strike, we are struck, we lose our envelope just as this thing, this work, loses its own--its forms, its mannerisms. We develop within it as it does within us. We enter and exit. We are always in this in-between of it and us. Rather quickly we understand there is about as much of an "it" as there is an "us" (or "me"). There is--There is only reality that neither immanates nor transcends: that's the obstacle--the good-obstacle or the bad-obstacle, but the chock, the chocking obstacle against what is neither within nor without, but an erected barrier: death, birth, love, spoken word. There we strike, we are struck. We do not remain in ourselves, we do not leave ourselves. Just in between: we get a bump, a bruise, a blood clot. Being gets out of there swollen, tumescent, distended. Neither fluid such as water immanent to water, nor leaping such as a dolphin transcending waves. Rather dull, dingy and uncertain like a Medusa between two waters. Admittedly, that Medusa terrifies the philosopher.
Jean-Luc Nancy, from "Imm/Trans"
Jean-Luc Nancy, from "Imm/Trans"
Friday, April 11, 2008
Thursday, April 10, 2008
Becoming everybody/everything is to world, to make a world. By process of elimination, one is no longer anything more than an abstract line, or a piece in a puzzle that is itself abstract. It is by conjugating, by continuing with other lines, other pieces, that one makes a world that can overlay the first one, like a transparency. Animal elegance, the camouflage fish, the clandestine: this fish is crisscrossed by abstract lines that resemble nothing, that do not even follow its organic divisions; but thus disorganized, disarticulated, it worlds with the lines of a rock, sand, and plants, becoming imperceptible....Perception will confront its own limit; it will be in the midst of things, throughout its own proximity, as the presence of one hacceity in other, the prehension of one by the other or the passage from one to the other: Look only at the movements.
--D&G
--D&G
Monday, March 31, 2008
Art is the most genuine and profound will to semblance, namely, to the scintillation of what transfigures, in which the supreme lawfulness of Dasien becomes visible. In contrast, truth is any given fixed apparition that allows life to rest firmly on a particular perspective and to preserve itself. As such fixation, "truth" is an immobilizing of life, and hence its inhibition and dissolution.
Heidegger, from "The New Interpretation of Sensuousness" in Nietzsche I
Heidegger, from "The New Interpretation of Sensuousness" in Nietzsche I
Wednesday, March 19, 2008
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